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Reasoning with the Charter 
Leon E. Trakman 
Butterworths Canada Ltd. 1991, pp.239 
Reasoning with the Charter, a critique of the current "liberalist" 
interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Through 
deconstruction of main judicial interpretations of the Charter Professor 
Trakman reconstructs the interpretative process to reveal the Charter's 
potential for positive action. 
Professor Trakman considers the attempts by the judiciary to 
limit interpretations of the Charter to traditional negative rights. He 
suggests that notwithstanding this limitation, these interpretations 
often reveal the potential for a positive construction within the Charter. 
Further, Professor Trakman criticizes judges for denying their political 
roles in society and demonstrates how judges do, in fact, exercise 
political influence. These philosophical underpinnings are extensively 
explored. 
Professor Trakman proposes a communitarian conception of 
liberty which does not abolish Charter liberalism, but puts it in its place 
by treating "private rights as a subset of the social sphere" .1 Individual 
rights, he argues, cannot be, and in reality are not separable from their 
social milieu. Thus, Professor Trakman seeks "community through 
communication" whereby groups are acknowledged as having a distinct 
role apart from government and the individual. To encourage "commu-
nicative discourse" between the parts, in their social context, with the 
Charter as the focus, is "to seek political harmony among diverse 
peoples".2 
This is an ambitious task. Reinterpreting the Charter to provide 
"discourse" to seek "political harmony", however, is not the book's main 
thrust. Except for the occasional diversion into these broader goals, 
Professor Trakman's focus is on the fallacies and inconsistencies of 
current judicial interpretation of Charter rights. 
A difficulty in following Professor Trakman's train of thought 
lies in the lack of concrete development of case law and societal issues. 
The general style throughout the book is to state very specific conclu-
sions without guiding the reader through his process of reaching these 
conclusions. For example, in Chapter Two, Professor Trakman attempts 
to develop a theme of group-group interaction to refute the traditional 
liberalist state-individual dichotomy: 
No group oflitigants, blacks, women or aboriginal peo-
ple, can personalize collective attitudes towards sex, 
race and religion without also affecting the social cli-
mate around them ... They affect prayer ... They encom-
pass special interest groups ... Within this wider sphere, 
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social interests move beyond adverse relations ... they 
entertain public perceptions of hunger, employment ... 
Thus, the pregnant woman's right not to give birth 
hinges as much upon the perceived availability of safe 
and humane abortion facilities as upon the right to foetal 
life itself. 3 
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Although the statements are by no means substantively incor-
rect, they do contain perspectives which need a context in order for the 
reader to fully appreciate them. The reader might like to know how or 
why the author came to a particular societal example, or why he uses it 
in a specific circumstance. Without any such elaboration, the technique 
of drawing on these examples is more distracting than illuminating. 
An exception to, and support of, this criticism is the chapter 
entitled "Morgentaler as Illustration"4 in which Professor Trakman 
grounds his critique in a review of the 1988 Supreme Court of Canada 
decision R. v. Morgentaler. Although he reiterates many of the state-
ments made earlier in the book, this chapter does provide an effective 
case illustration of his critique of current judicial interpretation of the 
Charter. 
Where Professor Trakman does not attempt to allude to societal 
examples in a random manner his ideas are persuasive. For example, in 
a subsection to Chapter Three entitled "Rights as Hierarchy"5 he 
critiques judicial interpretation of Charter rights as producing hierar-
chical relationships between groups and the individual. His argument 
establishes why courts should not seek this interpretative process. This 
analysis forgoes the distractions of random allusions to undeveloped 
issues and is all the more compelling for being an uncluttered statement 
of his ideas. 
On a more substantive level, Professor Trakman does not re-
spond to prevalent criticism of the system of rights as it exists in the 
Charter. His basic premise is that the rights themselves are valid. This 
is made clear by his constant focus on the interpretative process as 
engaged by the judiciary rather than on an evaluation of the rights as 
they stand within the Charter. Clearly, Professor Trakman's purpose is 
not to deconstruct the rights themselves. What he does not dispel 
however, is the possibility that his critique of the interpretative process 
may more properly be, in fact, a critique of the rights on which that 
interpretative process is based. 
For the purposes of the book, it might be that a response to 
criticisms of the system of rights as it exists within the Charter is not 
essential. Professor Trakman's apparent concern is not to move away 
entirely from a system of rights, but rather to reinterpret it so that it 
shifts away from the Western liberalist tradition. Yet, Reasoning with 
the Charter is situated within the Canadian context and, as such, 
requires a response to this fundamental criticism. The author does 
allude to the issue where he states "the rights discourse, undoubtedly, is 
alien to some". 6 It is possible that the construction of the rights as they 
exist within the Charter is not amenable to take account of certain 
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experiences in Canadian society. Professor Mary Ellen Turpel, for 
example, in "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpreta-
tive Monopolies, Cultural Differences", states: 
It is difficult for me to see any potential for sensitivity to 
the cultural differences of Aboriginal peoples in the 
constitutional rights paradigm. I could imagine a strong 
defence argument being developed under section 25 to 
the effect that, in the light of cultural differences, Abo-
riginal peoples are immune from Charter jurisprudence 
or interpretation. The Charter according to this argu-
ment, does not extend to them because of the incommen-
surability of the conceptual framework of the rights 
paradigm.7 
Perhaps, within the Canadian context, ProfessorTrakman could 
have directly responded to this viewpoint and specifically stated how his 
"communicative discourse", as based on a Western liberalist document, 
would operate to include those to whom the system ofrights is tradition-
ally uninclusive. 
Above all else, the book is a strong critique of the current judicial 
interpretation of the Charter. It forms the basis for compelling interpre-
tative reconstruction. Unfortunately, although Professor Trakman 
provides some reconstruction he shies away from concretely examining 
his conceptions of community and communicative discourse through the 
Charter. Reasoning with the Charter is thought provoking, but, if it had 
more bravely pursued its own potential for "communicative discourse" it 
would be all the more satisfying. 
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